Proper marketization of time resources is an effective way to improve efficiency

Source: Singapore Open Rui management consulting firm Aviation Research Center Author: Lee can 2009-09-28 10:20:27 I have two sentences ( 1 )

[ professional classification ] air traffic control [ Article ID ] 31-2009-0179

1. The time resources in the EU aviation market are managed and distributed by unified government agencies. The time resources available to airlines can only be realized through government-assigned and one-to-one exchange without cash. The EU market eliminates all forms of momentary transactions. Despite the recent attempts by the Heathrow Airport in the UK to auction the moment, the EU government and airlines did not respond positively. European major airlines seem to be looking forward to more moderate secondary market transactions.

2. The time resources in the US aviation market mainly include the FAA and the US Department of Transportation (DOT) for initial allocation. However, under the system of administrative distribution, the United States has established a relatively complete secondary market trading system in order to make up for the secondary market. The problem of low efficiency in the initial configuration, for this reason, the United States has established a "secondary market mechanism for blind people [1]". Moreover, the relatively open market economy environment in the United States gives the initial time auction – this more extreme – a certain experimental space for market means.

In December 2008, the US Department of Transportation decided to use time auctions to ease congestion at New York airports and improve flight delays across the United States. However, it was aborted under the collective opposition of the New York and New Jersey Port Authority, the American Air Transport Association (ATA), and the International Air Transport Association (IATA).

3. The rapid development of the domestic aviation industry has caused several major international hub airports in China to enter the period of resource shortage. At present, China's civil aviation time resource management mode is similar to the EU's "93/95 rule" system, and it mainly adopts the government-led administrative rationing method in aviation time management.

In terms of administrative system: In August 2007, the Interim Measures for the Administration of Flight Schedules of Civil Aviation was promulgated, which clearly stipulated that CAAC should be responsible for the overall management of civil aviation flight schedules, and have the final decision on the coordination and distribution results of national flight schedules. Stabilizing the government-led administrative rationing system

In terms of market capacity: 7 airports including Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou have been identified as coordinating airports [2]. With the change of flight congestion from point to point, some small and medium airports have begun to apply for coordination at the same time. In 2006, only the Civil Aviation Administration of China North China has Tianjin, Shijiazhuang, Baotou, Zhangjiakou and other small and medium airports. Coordination at the time of application. The resources of the domestic airports at all levels have entered the resource shortage period under the current passenger and cargo flows.


1. There is no substantial difference in the resource allocation mechanism between the United States and the European Union, but there are significant differences in specific operations and implementation details. Europe and the United States have not adopted a price mechanism, but adopted a quantitative limit, grandfather's rights, no need to lose, and a time pool system. The difference between Europe and the United States is mainly reflected in the fact that the United States has adopted a secondary trading market, and the EU has adopted a one-to-one exchange; the United States always allocates resources directly to the FAA, while the EU is the government and its time committee under its guidance. See Table 1.

Regional configuration mechanism United States EU
Price mechanism Does not exist, but is studied and experimented Does not exist but is studied
Take-off and landing cost mechanism exist exist
Quantity limit It existed since 1969, but it was affected by AIR-21. It has existed since 1993.
Configuration body Currently FAA EU-led coordinator and majority vote committee
Time resource allocation Initial configuration auction Being researched, ready to start trying Does not exist but is studied
Grandfather's rights Since 1986, it has remained Since 1993, it has been retained since
Lottery Used for time pool allocation, temporary time allocation and time recall Less adopted
Other mechanisms New entrant is preferred New entrants are preferred, commercial flights are prioritized, and time committees vote to coordinate
Secondary configuration Secondary market trading Exist, develop a blind trading system, and constantly improve does not exist
One-to-one exchange allow allow
other aspects No loss principle Existence (80% of the amount) Existence (80% of the amount)
Time pool system and time reservation system exist exist

2. Appropriate marketization of aviation time resources will help to improve the utilization efficiency of resources at the moment, and on the other hand, it can reduce the investment pressure of other aspects of the airport by utilizing the benefits obtained from the marketization of time resources. However, excessive marketization will also have a negative impact on the entire civil aviation system.

The advantages of moderate marketization:

Save airport investment and maximize the potential of existing airport resources through market mechanisms, rather than increasing time resources by creating new runways or new airports

The proceeds can alleviate the financial pressure of the airport and be used for other construction, such as environmental protection facilities; and this part of the proceeds can be used to reduce the airport construction fee that passengers need to pay.

Significantly improve the operational efficiency of airlines. Time trading will increase the cost of airlines, but airlines cannot raise fares. Because the demand in the aviation market is not determined by the cost of the airline, but by market demand and supply, airlines must further reduce costs and use more fuel efficient aircraft.

Insufficient over-marketing:

Marketization of resources at any time may lead to too much concentration in the hands of a few large airlines, forming a monopoly in the local market, thereby reducing market efficiency.

Excessive marketization may lead to a limited number of moments of interest, which in turn leads to flight delays throughout the civil aviation system. In the 1980s, the United States cancelled the limit on the number of moments. The increase in the number of hours at Chicago O'Hare Airport led to a large-scale flight delay in the US aviation system.

The marketization of resources at a time requires a very complete design of the trading mechanism, and the imperfect trading mechanism does not play a role in improving the utilization efficiency at all times.

3. Reasonable moderate marketization can make the use of time resources more efficient. The Interim Measures for the Administration of Civil Aviation Flight Schedules permits one-to-one exchange, but there is no one-to-one exchange that restricts capital intervention. This is the domestic moment. Marketization has created certain conditions, but there are still three problems in the current marketization in China:

1) The property rights of the resources at the time of flight take-off and landing are not clear. The property rights of the flight take-off and landing time resources include four parts: exclusive use rights, income rights, transfer rights and ownership. At present, the property rights structure of China's flight take-off and landing time resources is characterized by exclusive use rights and income rights, but the transfer rights are not sufficient and the ownership is not clear.

The "Provisional Measures for the Administration of Flight Time of Civil Aviation" recognizes the grandfather's rights of the time resources, which indicates that the time resources have exclusive use rights and income rights.

The Interim Measures for the Administration of Flight Schedules of Civil Aviation allows one-to-one exchanges but does not allow the purchase, lease and mortgage of resources at the time of flight take-off and landing. This shows that the right to transfer property rights at the moment is incomplete and cannot be transferred freely.

The flight departure and departure time in the Interim Measures for the Administration of Flight Schedules of Civil Aviation is defined as: “the arrival or departure time of a particular flight at a certain date provided or allocated by a certain flight”. Neither "ownership" nor "franchise" is mentioned. The ownership of resources at the time of flight take-off and landing is not clearly defined.

2) The main function of the allocation of resources at the time of flight departure and departure is not clear. The main function of the configuration of the flight take-off and landing time resources is not clear, mainly the function of the flight time coordination committee.

The subject of airport capacity assessment is not clear. The assessment of airport capacity in the allocation of resources in Europe and America is based on the air traffic control department, mainly based on construction planning and updating technology; while China is mainly based on the flight time coordination committee, and different committee members exist in the airport capacity information. There is a difference in asymmetry and incentives to control the number of airport moments.

The allocation of resources and the coordination of the resources are not clear. The 2007 Interim Measures stipulate that the Civil Aviation Administration, the Air Traffic Control Administration and the Regional Administration are responsible for the specific tasks such as the allocation, coordination and supervision of resources at all times, but the functions of the specific executor flight coordination committee and the time coordinator are not sufficient, especially the time coordinator. Not being valued, and the coordinator plays an important role in the initial coordinated distribution of European and American countries.

3) The allocation of resources at the time of flight departure and departure is not perfect. There are still some imperfections in the allocation of resources during the flight take-off and landing time, whether it is initial or secondary configuration.

At the time of the secondary configuration, the resource mobility is insufficient. Not only because of the lack of supervision of the rules of the moment, but also because of the fact that China does not allow the trading and leasing of resources at all times.

The initial configuration method lacks special handling for newly generated time resources. Existing resources and newly generated time resources have different impacts on airline-specific investments when they are allocated. Therefore, their distribution methods should be different, and China does not pay sufficient attention to these differences.

The mechanism for configuring the time resource in the time pool is not clear. Although the Interim Measures stipulate the establishment of a time pool system, it is not clear how to allocate the pool of time pools and how to allocate time pools.


1. Interim Measures for the Administration of Civil Aviation Flight Schedules

2. EU “93/95” rules

3, Kairui consulting civil aviation industry database

Note: [1] The blind secondary market uses a sealed bidding method. The airlines who want to sell/lease the flight time and take-off time will report the reserve price to the FAA in writing; the FAA will announce the time information to be traded on the designated website; all airlines will bid on the website electronically within the specified time period; The FAA will forward the highest bid to the selling/rental airline; at the time of sale/lease, the airline will feedback whether the FAA has reached a deal within a specified time. Throughout the process, the information on the sale/rental airline and the quoted bidding airline is only the FAA, and the parties to the transaction do not know each other until they agree to the transaction. Moreover, in the "Blind People's Secondary Market" transaction, the airline's sale/rental time is only the only consideration of the bid price (that is, the transaction is the sole currency). When the final transaction parties declare the FAA approval transaction, they must also go to the FAA. It is only the currency consideration that guarantees that this will or has been exchanged.

[2] Coordination of the airport is determined by the Interim Measures for the Administration of Flight Schedules of Civil Aviation. It refers to the airport where the number of flight movements has reached or is close to the airport's guaranteed capacity during a certain period of time. The coordination airport is divided into two categories: the primary coordination airport and the secondary coordination airport. The primary coordination airport refers to those airports where the demand exceeds the capacity and the adjustment is small. The secondary coordination airport means that the demand is close to its capacity, but there are still adjustments. The airports of the room.